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ROBERT B. HANSEN, 
Attorney General, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-v-
) 
) 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, 
and UTAH STATE RETIREMENT 
FUND; UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION, and UTAH STATE 
INSURANCE FUND; and UNI-
VERSITY OF UTAH, for and in 
behalf of the UNIVERSITY OF 
UTAH HOSPITAL for the UNI-
VERSITY MEDICAL CENTER; 
UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER 
TRUST FUND, FIRST SECURITY· 
BANK OF UTAH, TRUSTEE, 
Case Nos. 16851, 16714, and 
16560 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal involves the interpretation of the constitutional 
and statutory powers of the Attorney General of the State of Utah to 
appoint independent legal counsel for State agencies. The State Legis-
lature has enabled some State agencies and State funds to appoint their 
own independent counsel, but the Attorney General asserts that the Utah 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Constitution and pertinent statutes implemented in accordance 
therewith provide that only the Attorney General has the power 
to appoint independent legal counsel for State agencies and funds. 
Legislative attempts to the contrary derogate and diminish the clear 
constitutional authority of the Attorney General. 
The Attorney General appeals from adverse rulings, which, 
if allowed to stand, not only misinterpret the constitutional author-
ity of this office, but also approve disturbing inequities, allowing 
some agencies and funds to enjoy advantages and capabilities not 
shared by a 11. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On February 2, 1979, appellant filed this lawsuit in the 
District Court of the Third Judicial District, seeking a declaratory 
judgment and injunctive relief against all the named defendants: 
Utah State Retirement Board ("Retirement Board"); Utah State Retire-
ment Fund ("Retirement Fund"); Utah State Industrial Commission 
("Industrial Commission"), and Utah State Insurance Fund ("Insurance 
Fund"); University of Utah Hospital ("Hospital"), for the University 
Medical Center Trust Fund ("Medical Center Trust Fund"); First Secur-
ity Bank of Utah ("Bank"), Trustee. The Complaint alleged that State 
agencies, State funds, and quasi-State agencies and funds, by appoint-
ing their own legal counsel, were acting in contravention of the 
constitutional and statutory authority of the Attorney General. 
-2-
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Further, that said respondents could only reimburse the Attorney 
General if they received Federal funds. 
On February 20, 1979, respondents, Retirement Board and 
Retirement Fund, filed a Motion to Sever as to all respondents 
(R. 8, 9), which was denied on March 2, 1979, by Judge Sawaya 
(R. 21) 1n a Memorandum opinion. 
On June 5, 1979, Judge Durham granted a Motion for Su~­
mary Judgment (R. 42) in favor of the Medical Center Trust Fund 
and respondent, Bank, Trustee. (R. 70) 
In a Memorandum decision dated August 24, 1979, (R. 221), 
Judge Durham, treating a Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent, 
Insurance Fund, as a Motion for Summary Judgment, granted the same. 
On December 14, 1979, Judge Homer F. Wilkinson granted a 
Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of respondents, Retirement 
Board and Retirement Fund (R. 306, 307). On December 31, 1979, Judge 
Wilkinson also granted a Motion for Sunvnary Judgment in favor of 
respondent, Industrial Commission (R. 308, 309, 308A, 3088, and 308C). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
This is a consolidated appeal of the above three cases (16560, 
16714, and 16851), occasioned by four separate Orders from the ·District 
Court by two different judges. Appellant seeks a reversal of the de-
cisions of the Third Judicial District Court as to all respondents and 
the authority they assert to appoint their own 1ega1 counse 1. Appe 11 ant 
-3-
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maintains said claimed authority is without merit and unconstitu-
tiona 1. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 2, 1979, appellant, the Attorney General of 
the State of Utah, filed suit in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County, against the Utah State Retirement Board and Utah State Re-
tirement Fund; the Utah State Industrial Commission; the Utah State 
Insurance Fund, and the University of Utah, for and in behalf of the 
University of Utah Hospital for the University Medical Center Trust 
Fund and the First Security Bank of Utah, trustee for the Medical 
Center Trust Fund. 
The gravamen of the Complaint alleged that the agencies and 
the funds, by appointing their own legal counsel, were acting in con-
travention of the authority of the Attorney General. The authority 
of the Attorney General is provided for in Arto VII, Section 18 of the 
Utah Constitution, as follows: 
"The Attorney General shall be the legal adviser 
of the State Officers, and shall perform such other 
duties as may be provided by law." 
This authority is also provided for in Section 67-5-1, U.C.A. (1953), 
as amended, wherein it states the Attorney General shall: 
" ... prosecute or defend a 11 causes to which the 
state or any officer, board or commission thereof in 
an official capacity is a party; and he shall have charge 
as attorney of all civil legal matters in which the state 
is in anywise interested." 
-4-
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Section 67-5-5, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, reads: 
"Except where speci fi cal ly authorized by the Utah 
Constitution, or statutes, no agency shall hire legal 
counsel, and the attorney general alone shall have the 
sole right to hire legal counsel for each such agency. 
Unless he hires such legal counsel from outside his of-
fice, the attorney general shall remain the sole legal 
counsel for that agency. If such outside counsel is 
hired for an agency, then that agency must report to the 
attorney general for his approval the full costs of this 
counsel and the attorney genera 1 sha 11 pay the same. 11 
In particular, the Complaint alleged that the Retirement Board 
was an independent State agency and that the Retirement Fund was a 
quasi-State agency fund. The Complaint further alleged that the Utah 
State Industrial Commission was a State agency, and that the Utah State 
Insurance Fund was a quasi-State agency fund created by the Legisla-
ture and under the authority of the Finance Commission. 
It was further alleged that the University of Utah, for and in 
behalf of the University Medical Center, was a medical hospital and 
teaching college, authorized by the State Legislature and a State agency. 
It was further alleged that the University Medical Center Trust Fund, 
administered by First Security Bank as trustee to provide medical mal-
practice protection to physicians and other medical service individuals 
at the University Medical Center and funded, in part, from legislative 
appropriations, was a quasi-State agency fund. It was further alleged 
that the enactment of Senate Bill 172 in the 1979 General Session of the 
Utah Legislature was an unconstitutional delegation of power in contra-
vention of the authority of the Attorney General. Senate Bill 172 was 
-5-
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codified in Section 63-30-28, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, and, in 
pertinent part, reads as follows: 
11
• • • Notwi ths tandi ng any 1 aw to the contrary, 
the trust agreement between the governmental entity 
and the trustee may authorize the trustee to employ 
counsel to defend actions against the entity and its 
employees and to protect and safeguard the assets of 
the trust, to provide for claims investigation and ad-justment services, to employ expert witnesses and con-
sultants, and to provide such other services and func-
tions necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of 
the trust. 11 
The Attorney General contended that the legislation (herein~ 
after specifically cited in the Argument), which established the 
State agencies or State quasi-agency funds to the extent they author-
ized said bodies to appoint, hire, or their agents to so appoint or 
hire, usurped the constitutional duties and functions of the Attorney 
General in acting as legal adviser to State officers and State agencies 
and State-quasi agencies. 
Respondents Retirement Fund, Insurance Fund, and the Medical 
Center Trust Fund answered that they are independent trusts, receiving 
funds from others in addition to the State, and based on their origin 
of funds as well as general trust law, they are neither State agencies 
nor State.quasi-agency funds and are not, therefore, subject to the At-
torney General's constitutional authority to appoint legal counsel for 
State officers and State agencies; and that if they are in any way so 
controlled, Section 67-5-5, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, constitutes an 
-6-
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exception to said Attorney General's authority. Section 67-5-5, 
in pertinent part, states: 
"Except where specifically authorized by the 
Utah Constitution, or statutes, no agency shall 
hire legal counsel .•.. 11 
Said respondents maintain that since they are each specifically 
governed by statutes which authorize them to have legal counsel, 
there is no violation of the Attorney General's authority under 
Art. VII, Section 18 of the Utah Constitution; Sections 35-1-32, 
67-5-1, or 67-5-5, U.C.A. (1953), as amended. 
Respondents, Hospital, Medical Center Trust Fund, and 
Bank filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. With regard to this Motion, 
Judge Christine Durham rendered two Orders: the first granted Sum-
mary Judgments in favor of the Hospital, for and on behalf of the 
Medical Center Trust Fund, and the second in favor of the Insurance 
Fund. 
Appellant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with supporting 
memorandum against the Retirement Board, the Retirement Fund, and the 
Industrial Commission. The Retirement Board and Retirement Fund filed 
Motions for Summary Judgment. The Industrial Commission had in July, 
1979, previously filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Judge Homer F. 
Wilkinson granted all three Motions for Summary Judgment in favor of 
respondents. 
Subsequent to the Orders of Judge Durham and while the Motions 
before Judge Wilkinson were pending, appellant moved this Court to 
-7-
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consolidate all matters for this appeal, and the same was granted 
with the final portion of the record being put in place March 24, 
1980. ( R. 308A, 3088, 308C) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS ADOPTED 
BY THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, ART. V, SECTION 1, THE 
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL IS AN ELECTED OFFICE WITHIN 
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, HAVING BOTH COMMON~LAW POWERS AND 
DUTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL DUTIES. 
The Attorney General's authority is both as a member of the 
Executive Branch of government as well as an officer of court a part 
of the Judicial Branch of government. Therefore, the powers granted 
and inherent in his office should not be encroached upon by the Governor, 
the Executive Branch, or the Legislature. 
Art. V, Section l of the Utah Constitution, provides: 
"The powers of the government of the State of Utah sha 11 
be divided into three distinct departments, the Legislative, 
the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with 
the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 
departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to 
either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly 
directed or permitted." 
The Attorney General, in acting as legal adviser for public officers, 
functions in an executive role. Some States appoint their Attorney Gen-
erals, and this is done by constitutional mandate. Others are elected, 
as is the case in Utah. The Attorney General also gives advice to the 
-8-
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judiciary, as he and his staff appear in the various courts of 
this State, and as officers of said courts, give legal advice and 
guidance. This concept is illustrated in State v. City of Kansas 
City, Kansas, 186 Kans. 190, 350 P.2d 37, in an action of .9.!!Q. 
warranto in a question as to whether the Attorney General could 
intervene in the Supreme Court and supersede the county attorney in 
an action. The Kansas Supreme Court, March 5, 1960, at page 42 of 
the opinion, says: 
11 We conclude the Attorney General by his motion 
to intervene and supersede the county attorney exercised 
his powers and duties under the Constitution and appropriate 
statutes. This was as far as he could go as an executive 
officer and as an attorney and officer of this court. Since 
he is an officer of the judicial branch, under the separation 
of powers of the three branches of government, he was limited 
and restricted in his conduct before this court by the code 
of professional ethics ... to the same extent any other lawyer 
would be. If, therefore, the Attorney General considered the 
action unmeritorious, he not only had the authority, but he 
also had a duty to move for dismissal. We cannot think the 
framers of our State Constitution or the members of the Legis-
lature ever intended that the Governor should have control 
over the judicial branch, or its officers, as is advocated .... 
Each of the three branches of our government should be zealous 
of its jurisdiction, and each should be vigilant to see that 
it does not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the other two .... " 
{Emphasis added.) 
Art. V, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution, was not intended 
to create three completely autonomous bodies, but was intended to create 
three separate branches of government that make up the traditional struc-
ture in this country. Madison commented on the concept in The Federalist, 
-9-
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No. XLVII Vol. l, p. 331 (Cent L. Jed 1916): 
11 0•• He /Montesquie/ did not mean that these 
departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no 
control over, the acts of each other. His meaning, as 
his own words import, and still more conclusively as 
illustrated by the example in his eye, can amount to 
no more than this, that where the whole power of one 
department is exercised by the same hands which possess 
the whole power of another· department, the fundamental 
principles of a free Constitution are subverted .••• " 
The purpose of an elected Attorney General is to give him 
some degree of autonomy as he functions as legal adviser to all State 
officers, agencies, quasi-State agencies; State agency funds and quasi-
State agency funds. That autonomy must be in the office of the Attorney 
Genera 1 . This was we 11 illustrated by State v. City of Kansas City, 
supra, where it was attempted that the Attorney General would be ordered 
to do this or that at the bidding of the Governor, when, in his inde-
pendent legal judgment and as legal adviser to the State, acting both 
for State officers as well as in the best interest of the people of the 
State, he may have to move forward with an action separate and distinct 
from that desired by, or even ordered by, the Governor. 
On the Federal level and in many States, the Attorney General 
is appointed rather than elected. Appellant alleges, therefore, that our 
structure for separation of powers as it directly affects the office of 
the elected Attorney General in the State of Utah means that the framers 
of the Utah Constitution desired that the Attorney General function as a 
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separate legal adviser for the administration of State government 
within the Executive Branch but not subservient solely to the Exe-
cutive Branch, acting as a separate constitutional office. 
Each of the departments and divisions of State government 
has autonomy and importance. We ask: Why is the Attorney General 
an elected rather than an appointed officer within the Executive 
Branch? The reason is to enable the Attorney General to be answerable 
to the public and to respond to the public weal. His responsibility is 
ultimately to those who elect him, as is every elected officer of the 
Executive Branch. If they do not function as desired by the people 
of the State of Utah, then a change can be made in that constitutionally 
elected office just as that change can be made in any· other elected 
official of the State government, starting at the level of Governor. 
Under our separation of powers within the State of Utah, the 
Legislature cannot adversely affect the executive role of Governor, 
except as it does so within the confines of its own constitutionally 
delegated powers. The Legislature is elected and responsible to the pub-
lic at large for its conduct. By the same token, the Legislature and 
its powers cannot be emasculated by the Executive Branch or merely 
function as a rubber stamp of the Governor but operates side-by-side 
in those separate roles--one creating law and the other having a 
responsibility of carrying those laws into effect through the executive 
structure of State government. 
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Likewise, the Judicial Branch has its autonomy, and it, like-
wise, serving as elected officials of the State, is ultimately re-
sponsible to the people. 
(A) COMMON-LAW DUTIES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Hansen v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 47, 456 P.2d 177, again settled 
the question as to whether Utah accepts the doctrine that common-law 
powers and duties were in the office of the Attorney General. The Court 
stated at page 178: 
"However, this Court has repeatedly held that the 
Attorney General has common-law powers and duties." 
The Court quoting Olsen v. Public Service Commission, 129 Mont. 106, 
283 P. 2d 594 (1955), as a case re 1 i ed upon, was due to the simi 1 ari ty 
between the Utah and Montana Cons ti tuti ons on this subject. (Other States 
do not have common~law powers, such as Idaho and New Mexico.) 
Both cases quoted a landmark decision in this field, Darling 
Apartment Co. v. Springer, 25 Del. Ch. 420, 22 A.2d 397, 403, 137 A.L.R. 
803, 811, which says: 
"The authorities substantially agree that in addition 
to those conferred upon it by statute, the office (the 
Attorney General) is clothed with all the powers and duties 
pertaining thereto at common law; and as chief law officer 
of the state, the Attorney General, in the absence of express 
legislative restriction to the contrary, may exercise all 
such power and authority as the public interests may from 
time-to-time require. In short, the Attorney General's powers 
are as broad as the common law unles~ restricted or modified 
by statute." 
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In Hansen v. Barlow, supra, case, the Court concludes: 
"After consideration of our Constitution, statutes 
and decisions of sister courts, we are of the opinion that it 
is within the rights of the Attorney General, if not his duty, 
to bring suits to clarify the constitutionality of laws 
enacted by the Legislature if it deems it appropriate. He 
is in a much more informed, duty entrusted, and advantageous 
position to do so than the individual citizen and taxpayer." 
Hansen v. Barlow, supra, was brought by the Attorney General 
to determine the rightness and constitutionality of legislative enact-
ments, which encroach upon his constitutional and statutory authority. 
In Hansen v. Barlow, supra, both the questiorsof the Attorney General 
having common-law powers and having the right and duty to make this type 
of determination, are set at rest. 
B. · THE ATTORNEY GENERAL MUST OPERATE WITHIN THIS 
SEPARATION OF POWERS IN HIS CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
ELECTED AUTHORITY, EVEN IN FACE OF SUBSEQUENT 
STATUTORY INROADS. 
Hansen v. Barlow, supra, well illustrates the necessity for 
the Attorney General, by virtue of his inherent authority, to initiate 
actions to determine whether legislative amendments are right or consti-
tutional. The Attorney General further has a duty to intervene as illus-
trated by State v. City of Kansas City, Kansas, supra, and this responsibility 
is further illustrated by a South Dakota case where Judge Campbell, in 
Johnson v. Jones, 48 S.Dak. 397, 204 N.W. 897, says: 
"Viewing all sections together, we believe the most 
ljberal construction that could be placed upon the 
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authority granted by Section 5 of the original Act to 
1 emp1 oy attorneys '· would be to ho 1 d that the boa rd 
authorized to employ attorneys for mere routine matters 
requiring the services of an attorney, but not requiring 
the rendering of legal advice or opinions upon points 
of law, or matters of legal right or policy of the board, 
and we think that any such attorneys so employed would 
be under the supervision, control, and direction of the 
Attorney General as general legal adviser of the board.o. 
There was a conflict between the allowance by statute of 
II 
a board to have legal counsel and the Attorney General's power to ap-
point. The Court resolved the conflict reserving certain authority in 
the Attorney General and showing that there must be a limitation so as 
not to improperly encroach upon the general powers of the Attorney 
General, as legal adviser--not only for the board but for all State 
officers. 
In Keenan v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of 
Essex, 101 N.J. Super. 495, 244 A.2d 705, the Court said, at page 711: 
11 
••• The exclusive right of the Attorney General to 
represent the State agency .• o was derived from that of-
ficial common-law status as the legal representative of 
the sovereign and his historic identification with the 
public interest. Therefore, he exercises 'all such power 
and authority as the public interest may from time-to-time 
require' in the absence of 'express legislative restriction 
to the contrary. '" 
In that case the Superior Court of New Jersey held that the County 
Superintendent of Elections, also a Commissioner of Registration as an 
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officer of State government, does not have the power to appoint 
legal counsel of his own choosing in contravention of the Attorney 
General and his common-law powers. 
In State v. Public Service Commission, 283 P.2d 594 (1955), 
the Court held that the fact the Attorney General was the attorney for 
the State Public Service Commission did not affect his right or duty 
to institute proceedings to set aside telephone rates as fixed by the 
Commission. The Court held that the Attorney General has the power 
within his office, by virtue of this constitutional and common-law 
power, to proceed against public officers to require them to perform 
duties which they owe to the public in general and to set aside such 
· action as shall be determined to be in excess of their authority. and to 
have them compelled to execute their authority in accordance with law. 
If the Attorney General, as a constitutional office and as an 
elected official, does not have the reasonable autonomy to function within 
the office and under the common-law powers granted and within the frame-
work of the separation of powers of the Utah Constitution, both the Legis-
lature and the Executive Branch, through the Governor, could make inroads 
that would deeply violate these fundamental constitutional principles. 
The results could be adverse to the wishes of the electorate to whom the 
Attorney General and all other elected officials are responsible and 
would be violative of the constitutional grant of authority and the will 
of those who created the Constitution in the move from a territorial to a 
statehood status. This is additionally illustrated by Argument II. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT II 
THE PROVISIONS IN SECTION 49-9-3, U.C.A. _ 
(1953), AS AMENDED; SECTION 49-9-10, U.C.A. (1953), AS AMENDED; SECTION 53-31-46, U.C.A. 
(1953), AS AMENDED, AND SECTION 63-30~28, 
U.C.A .. (1953), AS AMENDED, CONTRAVENE THE 
PROVISIONS OF ART. VII, SECTION 18, OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH, AND SECTION 
67-5-1, U.C.A. (1953), AS AMENDED, WHICH MAN-
DATE THAT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL SHALL BE THE 
LEGAL ADVISER FOR STATE OFFICERS OR COMMIS= 
SIONS AND HAVE CHARGE OF ALL CIVIL LEGAL MATTERS. 
~- ART. VII, SECTION 18 OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, AND SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION 
ESTABLISH THE GENERAL DUTIES AND AUTHORITIES OF 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL. 
Art. VII, Section 18 of the Utah Constitution, creates and 
prescribes the duties of the Attorney General. Section 18 provides: 
"The attorney general shall be the legal ad-
viser of the State officers and shall perform such 
other duties as may be provided by law. 11 
Section 67~5-l, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, provides that the 
general duties of the Attorney General require him to: 
11 
••• prosecute or defend all causes to which 
the state or any officer, board or commission 
thereof in an official capacity is a party; and 
he shall have charge as attorney of all civil legal 
matters in wh,ich the state is in anywise interested. 11 
Section 67-5-5, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, reads: 
11 Except where speci fi ca 1 ly authorized by the Utah 
Constitution, or statutes, no agency shall hire legal 
counsel, and the attorney general alone shall hdve the 
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sole right to hire legal counsel for each such 
agency. Unless he hires such legal counsel~ 
from outside his office, the attorney general 
shall remain the sole legal counsel for that agency. 
If such outside counsel is hired for an agency, then 
that agency must report to the attorney general for his 
approval the full costs of this counsel and the attor-
ney general shall pay the same. 11 
Each of the respondents claims statutory authority, 
separate from the Attorney General's Office, to hire or appoint in-
dependent legal counsel. Illustrative of this is the claim of the 
State Insurance Fund, Section 35-3-1, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, 
which reads, in partinent part, as follows: 
11 In the conduct and administration of the 
business of said fund the commission of finance 
may appoint with the approval of the governor, a 
manager, and may employ accountants, inspectors, 
attorneys, physicians, investigators, clerks, steno-
graphers, and such other experts and assistants as it 
deems advisable. 11 
The above language is in direct conflict with the language 
of Art. VII, Section 18 of the Utah Constitution. Given this conflict 
between State statutes and the cited constitutional provisions, this 
Court must declare the stat~te unconstitutional should it conclude, as 
urged here, that the Director of the Department of Finance (Director 
of Finance shall herein refer to the Commission of Finance) is a State 
officer and administrator of the State Insurance Fund. 
B. THE MOST RECENT PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT ON THIS POINT SUPPORTS THE 
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INTERPRETATION THAT THE DIRECTOR OF FINANCE 
IS A STATE OFFICER. 
In Hansen v. Legal Services Committee of the Utah State 
Legislature, 19 Utah 2d 231, 429 P.2d 979 (1967), the Attorney 
General for the State of Utah, Phil L. Hansen, brought suit, chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the Legal Services Committee of the 
State Legislature. The question raised by the Attorney General was 
whether the State Legislature, by enactment of a statute, could hire 
its own independent legal adviser. The Court held that the legisla= 
tors are State officers within the meaning of Art. XXIV, Section 12, 
of the Utah Constitution, for whom the Attorney General alone serves 
as legal adviser (Art. VII, Section 18). Hence, the Court struck down 
the statute which attempted to circumvent Art. VII, Section 18.· Subse-
quently, the Legislature, in order to accomplish its purposes, was 
forced to amend the Utah Constitution. The amendment (Art. VI, Section 
32), provides: 
"The Legislature may appoint temporary or 
permanent nonmember employees for work during 
and between sessions, including independent legal 
counsel which shall provide and control all legal 
services for the Legislature except as the Legisla-
ture b law shall authorize erformance thereof by 
the attorney general." Emphasis added. 
The Department of Finance was first created in 1941 and placed 
under the supervision of a three-member commission. A 1963 amendment to 
Section 63-2-2, U.C.A. (1953), substituted the provisions for creation of 
the office of director of finance for provisions relating to the former 
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corrmission of finance. 
The Court in Hansen perceived the Legislature's actions 
as an attempt to emasculate the powers and diminish the duties of 
the Attorney General. The Court noted in its opinion that, on at 
least eight previous occasions, similar attempts had been thwarted: 
"Certain pressures tried to abolish the office 
of the Attorney General as a member of the Board of 
Examiners, by constitutional amendment at the elec-
tion last year. The people turned down that attempt, 
along with seven others, by a thumping 70% vote be-
cause apparently they thought our Constitution borne 
by the seat of its framers in an unairconditioned 
building did a pretty good job which has served the 
commonwea 1th pretty we 11 . " ( 19 Utah 2d at 232, 429, 
P.2d at 980) 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized the danger-
ous ramifications of a contrary ruling which would allow the Leg~slature 
to encroach upon the Attorney General's constitutional grant of powers. 
The instant case highlights the continuing attempts to re-
duce the Attorney General's powers by allowing a State agency, State 
trust fund, a State director (or commission), or a quasi-State agency 
or fund, rather than the Legislature, to hire independent legal counsel. 
The question is the same; only the parties have changed. The quintes-
sential issue still emerges as whether the constitutional grant of power 
to the Attorney General may be emasculated or diminished, allowing ap-
pointed or lesser-elected State officers to do the very things that the 
Legislature cannot do. Such an impermissible result was anticipated by 
Hansen, as the following observation aptly reveals: 
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11 If the l egi s 1 a tu re, by fiat, could create its 
own legal adviser, then logic would say it could 
create 50 or more others for itself, each of which, 
of course, would have to have secretaries and other 
personnel. Such legislation could be extended to 
legal advisers for the Governor, State Auditor, 
Treasurer, Secretary of State and everyone else, 
in which event the office of Attorney General effec-
tively could be emasculated and rendered impotent. 
We believe the framers of the Constitution had no 
such intention in mind under our tri-partite system 
of government." (19 Utah 2d at 233, 429 P.2d at 
980) (Emphasis added.) 
The Court's deliberate use of the open-ended phrase "and everyone 
else" is sufficiently broad to encompass the appointed and lesser-
' elected State officers, since such officers usually belong to the Exe-
cutjve Branch of which the Governor, Auditor, Treasurer, and Secretary 
of State are the chief officers. The former are agents of the latter. 
C. THE STATE INSURANCE FUND IS NOT A LEGAL ENTITY, 
SEPARATE AND APART FROM THE DIRECTOR OF FINANCE. 
The State Insurance Fund consists of private monies collected 
as premiums from employers to provide insurance coverage for employee in-
juries and diseases (which are work-related and covered by the Utah Work-
men's Compensation Act, cite). On several occasions this Court has re-
ferred to the State Insurance Fund as being analogous to private insurers. 
State Tax Commission v. Department of.Finance, Utah 576 P.2d 1297 (1978}; 
Gronning v. Smart, Utah 561 P.2d 690 (1977); and Chez v. Industrial Com-
mission of Utah, 90 Utah 447, 62 P.2d 549 (1936). A fundamental differ-
ence, however, between the State Insurance Fund and private insurance 
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enterprises is that the latter enjoys legal standing while the 
former does not. Private insurers are generally corporations or 
partnerships with legal standing, but the State Insurance fund 
per se, in a strict legal sense, is little more than an inanimate 
collection of funds. 
The most authoritative source for the rule just cited 
is Ban S. Kariya Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 67 Utah 301, 
247 P. 490 (1926). In Ban S. Kariya Co., the Court was initially 
asked to review the action of the Industrial Commission in awarding 
compensation to the widow and surviving children of an employee who 
was accidentally killed while working on the job. The deceased's em-
ployer belonged to the State Insurance Fund. The employer later filed a 
Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Review. The defendant widow and 
minor children also interposed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Review. 
The widow and minor children argued, in part, that the State Insurance 
Fund did not possess legal capacity to petition for such a review. 
In granting the Motions to Dismiss and to Quash, the Court agreed that 
the State Insurance Fund was without legal standing and stated: 
"The effort of the Legislature by the amendment of 
1921 to give the state insurance fund the right to appear 
as a party to have an award of the Commission reviewed must 
be held to be nugatory and of no effect. We have endeavored 
to point out that the Legislature has in no way attempted to 
make, nor has it made, the state insurance fund an independent 
entity disassociated from the Industrial Commission. The 
fund is not given any of the powers usually provided or 
deemed necessary for the functioning of a body corporate. 
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the question is who shall appoint legal counsel to represent 
the Director of Finance in matters concerning its administra-
tive actions and conduct while acting in his official capacity. 
Hence, regardless of the source or nature of its monies, the 
Insurance Fund only becomes a legal entity for purposes of re-
presentation when joined with its public administrator, the 
Director of Finance. 
As was successfully argued by the Attorney General be-
fore the Utah Supreme Court in Hansen, Art. VII, Section 18 of 
the Utah Constitution, really contains two parts: the first makes 
the Attorney General 11 the legal adviser for State officers. 11 The 
second part of Art. VII, Section 18 of the Utah Constitution, pro-
vides that he" ... shall perform such other duties as may be pro-
vided by law. 11 The Legislature, in Section 67-5~ 1, U.C.A. (1953), 
as amended, statutorily empowered the Attorney General to "prosecute 
or defend all causes to which the state or any officer, board or com-
mission thereof in an official capacity is a party. 11 
Section 67-5-5, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, vests in the 
Attorney General the sole right to hire legal counsel for State 
agencies, except for those cases in which another procedure is specif-
ically authorized by statute. 
-24-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Clear and substantial evidence exists to support 
the inclusion of the Director of Finance within the ranks of 
"State officers 11 for whom the Attorney General serves as legal 
adviser. It should be noted that the "State officers" referred 
to in Art. VII, Section 18 of the Utah Constitution, are not 
necessarily the elected executive, judicial, and legislative 
officials enumerated in Art. XXIV, Section 12 of the Utah Con-
stitution. Art. XXIV, Section 12, provides: 
"The State Officers to be voted for at the 
time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall 
be a Governor, ·secretary of State, State Auditor, 
State Treasurer, Attorney General, Superintendent 
of Public Instruction, Members of the Senate and 
House of Representatives, three Supreme Judges, 
nine District Judges, and a Representative to 
Congress." (Emphasis added.) 
Art. XXIV was designed and written to facilitate a smooth transi-
tion from a territorial to a State government. The transitional 
nature of Art. XXIV is unmistakably expressed in the language of 
Art. XXIV, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution, which states, in 
. part: 
"In order that no inconvenience may arise, 
by reason of the change from a Territorial to a 
State Government... . " 
In other words, the specific purpose of Art. XXIV, Section 12, was 
to list those State officers "to be voted for at the time of the 
adoption of (the) Constitution," rather than to name the State 
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officers whom the Attorney General was to advise legally. Had 
the latter purpose been intended, Section 12 would have been more 
correctly worded as follows: 
"The State officers to whom the Attorney General 
shall serve as legal adviser, shall be ••.. 11 
The implication that the "State officers" referred to 
in Article VII, Section 18, coincide with the "State officers to 
be voted for at the time of the adoption of {th~ Constitution. 
Article XXIV, Section 12, first arose in Hanseno The painstaking 
distinctions made in this analysis of Art. VII, Section 18, were ap-
parently not considered and were understandably not necessary in 
light of the question presented in Hanseno The core question on ap-
peal there was whether State legislators were to be considered "State 
officers" within the meaning of Art. VII, Section 18. State legislators 
under even the strictest definitions would generally be classified as 
"State officers." Thus, the elected officials enumerated in Art. 
XXIV, Section 12, are "State officers" because of the nature and scope 
of their official duties, rather than because they happened to be in-
cluded in that particular section of the Constitution. We further sub-
mit that the only fair and reasonable reading of the reference to Art. 
XXIV, Section 12, in Hansen, is that of a constitutional citation which 
supported the virtually self-evident conclusion that legislators are 
State officers. 
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The question then becomes whether the Constitution con-
templates that the Attorney General should only serve as the legal 
adviser to the elected officials who were voted for at the time of 
the adoption of the Constitution, or whether its language is suffi-
ciently broad to encompass subsequently elected and appointed State 
officials. At the time of the adoption of the State Constitution, 
it was wholly true that the Attorney General was only serving as 
legal adviser to the State officers who existed. Recognition of 
that fact, nevertheless, does not mean that the framers of the Consti-
tution did not contemplate that the number of elected and appointed 
State officials, especially in the Executive Branch, would neces-
sarily expand to keep pace with the advance of time and increase of 
population. Nor does it suggest that the framers ever·· anticipated 
that subsequently elected or appointed State officers would not be 
transacting business or exercising authority under the guise of power 
derived from the sovereignty of the State. 
If the position is taken that the Utah Constitution, as 
presently worded, contemplates as State officers only those elected 
officials expressly mentioned in Art. XXIV, Section 12, then irrational 
and bothersome incongruities surface. For instance, since Art. XXIV, 
Section 12, has never been amended, we must presume that the Attorney 
General serves as the legal adviser to a position now defunct (repre-
sentative to Congress). Even a more strained interpretation is the 
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conclusion that only three of the five current justices to the 
Utah Supreme Court could legally be advised by the Attorney General~ 
and only nine of the current sitting district judges would be privy 
to the same benefit. The question must also be raised whether the 
1912 amendment to the Utah Constitution, whereby the office of 
Superintendent of Public Instruction was made an appointive rather 
than an elective position, nullified the superintendent's right to 
receive legal advice from the Attorney General. And what about 
oth_er appointive offices subsequently created by constitutional 
amendment, such as Art. XIII, Section 11, which authorizes the 
creation of the State Tax Commission. Could one in good conscience 
argue that officials who are constitutionally delegated the power 
"to administer and supervise the tax laws of the State" are not "State 
officers?" Moreover, how can the choice of words in Art. VII, Sec-
tion 10, concerning the Governor's appointive power be hannonized with 
the State officer definition of Art. XXIV, Section 129 if appointed 
officials are excluded? The former provision states: 
"The Governor sha 11 nominate, and by and with con-
sent of the Senate~ appoint all State and district of-
ficers whose offices are established by this Constitution, 
or which may be created.by law~·and whose appointment or 
electicrn is not otherwise provided for." (Emphasis added.) 
Such examples are but a sampling of the inconsistencies that 
one must reconcile if he elects to assume the position that the Consti-
tution contemplates the Attorney General will be the legal adviser only 
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to those "State officers" who were "voted for at the time of the 
adoption of Lth~ Constitution, 11 --a position taken by Judge Dur-
ham in the lower court. (On oral argument) 
Additional persuasive evidence follows to support the ar-
gument that the Director of Finance is a "State officer" within the 
contemplation of the Utah Constitution. First, the Constitutional 
Convention considered the position of Attorney General and seemed to 
indicate that the primary duty would be advising State officers. 
The convention members also recognized that additional duties would 
be provided by the Legislature. Although the convention's central focus 
was on the Attorney General's salary, direct comments were made, in-
dicating that the Attorney General would supervise "the legal business 
in behalf of the State." This same thought appears several times in a 
short dialogue on the floor between two delegates to the convention: 
"MR. CHIDESTER: Yes, I presume it is, but I believe 
that this reaches further, if it is contemplated by 
this section that the attorney general shall conduct the 
legal business in behalf of the State, such as prosecuting 
and the like of that, he could not begin to do it for 
that sum. Was that the intention? 
"MR. VARIAN: The duties of the Attorney General, Mr. 
Chairman, would be as suggested, to advise the State 
officers, attend to all business, criminal and otherwise, 
of the State in the Supreme Court. But in exceptional cases, 
he might be invited and might go out into a county to 
assist in the prosecution of some important matter. They 
generally do that, but they are not obliged to. 
"MR. CHIDESTER: Under the present system, there is to be 
several deputies or assistant prosecuting attorneys, would 
he have to pay them himself? 
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11 MR0 VARIAN: No. I think the gentleman misappre-
hends ito There will be a system of county or dis~ 
trict attorneys who will attend to all matters of the 
kind indicated in the nisi prius courtso The Attor-
ney General simply takes the cases on appeal-=briefs 
them, and argues them in the appellate court. lf. 
there are any civil cases to which the State would be 
a party, it would be his duty to bring them or defend 
them, as the case might be. 11 
(Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, 1895, 
Vol. II, page 1028.) (Emphasis added.) 
If, indeed, it were contemplated that the Attorney General should super-
vise all the legal business of the State, then this implies the in-
clusion of appointed and lesser elected officials who engage in State 
business as "State officers." 
Second, in McCormick v·. Thatcher, 8 Utah 294, 30 P .1091 
(1892), the Court held that the members of the Board of Trustees of 
the State Agricultural College were State officers. The Court defined 
the elements of being an officer in terms of the duties and powers exer-
cised. The Court's ruling lends support to the conclusion that the term 
"State officers 11 as used in Art. VII, Section 18, was intended to encom-
pass all officials exercising the sovereign powers of the State. 
Third, both the more comprehensive and the more restrictive 
definitions of "State officer" as stated in Words and Phrases would sus-
tain the classification of the Director of Finance as a State officer. 
Two liberal constructions define "State officer" as follows: 
11 A 'state officer' is one created l5y the Legis-
lature or established by the Constitution. Williams 
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v. Guerre, 162 So. 609, 182 La. 745. (Words and 
Phrases, page 76) 
"In a sense, a 'state officer' is one whose jurisdiction, duties, and functions are coextensive 
with the State, and who receives his authority under 
State laws and performs some of the governmental func-
tions of the State." Texas Liquor Control Bd. v. Con-
tinental Distillin Sales Co., Tex. Cfv. App., 199 S.W. 
2d 1009, 1012. Words and Phrases, page 76) 
In contrast, one of the narrowest definitions of "State officer" reads: 
"The tenn 'state officers' may be construed as 
meaning only heads of the executive departments of the 
State elected by the people at large, such as Governor, 
Lieutenant Governor, State Treasurer, Secretary of 
State, Attorney General, and the like, that being its 
particular meaning, or given its more comprehensive sense, 
including every person whose duties appertain to the State 
at large, according to the legislative intention; that the 
exact sense in which the term is used in any particular law 
must often be determined by ordinary rules for judicial con-
struction. Applying the rules that effects and consequences 
are to be regarded in construing a law, where the words 
thereof will admit of either of two reasonable meanings, 
the court held that in the law in question the words 'any 
of the state officers' should be restrained to heads of 
department having their official residence at the State 
Capitol, and expected to keep open office there during busi-
ness hours, and generally speaking to be there themselves; 
that is, that the term was used by the lawmakers in its narrow 
and particular, instead of its broad and general, sense. 11 
State ex rel. Williams v. Samuelson, 111 N.W. 712-715, 131 
Wis. 499, citing and approving State ex rel. Milwaukee Medical 
College v. Chittenden, 107 N.W. 506, 127 Wis. 468. Words 
and Phrases, page 79. 
The Director of Finance's powers and duties are an exercise of govern-
mental powers coextensive with the State. The Director further qualifies 
as a State officer under the more restrictive definition since he is the 
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head of the Department of Finance, which department has its offi-
cial residence at the State Capitol and maintains an open office 
with regular hours. 
It is urged upon this Court that the clear evidence is 
to the effect the Director of the Department of Finance be considered 
in his own right a "State officer" within the contemplation of the 
Utah Constitution. Also, the Director of Finance may still be found 
to be a "State officer" under Art. VII, Section 18, upon the theory 
that the Director is a direct agent of the Governor.. The express pro= 
visions of Sections 63-2-1 and 63-2-2, Utah Code Anna (1953), as amended, 
clearly enunciate the agency relationship between the Governor and the 
Department of Finance (or the director as the department 1s head).. Utah 
Code Ann., SectTon 63-2-1 (1953), as amended, reads: 
"Department of finance created--Construction of 
authorities and duties imposed.--There is created a 
department to be known as the department of finance 
attached to the office of the governor to assist the 
governor in the execution of his constitutional duties 
as the state's chief executive officer and which shall 
perform such duties and functions as may be prescribed 
by law ..... and prescribing other budgetary functions 
under the constitutional authority of the state's chief 
executive to transact all executive business for the 
state, as differentiated from the examination of claims 
as may be exercised by the board of examiners." 
. (Emphasis added.} 
Section 63-2-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, reads: 
"Appointment of director of finance--Duties--Oath--
Salary and expenses.--The administration of the department 
shall be under the supervision, direction and control of a 
director who shall be known as the director of financeo 
The director of finance shall be the state's chief fiscal 
officer; and ex officio, the state's budget officer, the 
state's ersonnel officer, the state's urchasin a ent, 
an the state ~ accounti~g O i~er. The director o inance 
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shall be appointed by the governor by and with 
the consent of the Senate and shall serve at the 
will and pleasure of the governor .... 11 
(Emphasis added.) 
The unequivocal language of the statutes confirms that 
the Director of Finance is the Governor's primary agent in State 
fiscal matters. In fact, Section 63-2-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953}, 
as amended, goes so far as to.designate the Director of Finance as 
11 the State's chief fiscal officer." Again the question is raised: 
Why should agents be allowed to do things that their principals are 
constitutionally prohibited from doing? The Governor may not hire 
his own independent legal counsel; the Utah Constitution mandates 
that the Attorney General shall serve as the Governor's legal adviser. 
What sense could there be in permitting the Governor's agent to cir-
cumvent a clear constitutional prohibition for the purpose of_ doing 
the very thing that the Governor himself cannot do. This "backdoor 
approach," aimed at usurping the Attorney General's constitutionally 
conferred power to appoint legal counsel, will certainly be perceived 
by the Court for what it really is. Hence, until such time as the Utah 
Constitution is amended to provide otherwise, "State officers," which 
include the Director of Finance and other State boards, commissions, 
departments and agencies (with the sole exception of the State Legis-
lature (Art. VI, Section 32), must procure their legal advice and as-
sistance under the supervision of the Attorney General. For these 
reasons, Section 35-3-1, Utah Code Ann. (1953}, must be declared, in 
-33-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
part, unconstitutional, as being in contravention of Arto VII9 
Section 18 of the Utah Constitution. 
D. THE AUTHORIZATION BY THE LEGISLATURE TO 
EMPOWER AGENCIES TO PAY FOR LEGAL SERVICES 
DOES NOT CARRY WITH IT THE POWER TO APPOINT 
LEGAL COUNSEL. 
Because legislation authorizes that certain State agencies 
or government-related agencies are authorized to pay for legal services 
or accounting services from the funds of their agency9 does not, 
therefore; mean they alone have the right or power to appoint said 
legal counsel for the agency or board where there is clear constitu-
tional authority for the Attorney General to do so. 
The present wording of the Utah statutes suggests the poten-
tial that the Attorney General's office could be in a conflict of in-
terest with respect to its obligation to defend the Industrial Commis-
sion and State Insurance Fund (Department of Finance). 
Admittedly, conflict of interest problems could arise in 
those situations in which the Attorney General's office represents the 
Industrial Corrmission on one side as administrator of the "Second Injury 
Fund" and the adverse interests of the State Insurance Fund on the other 
side. It should be noted, however, that this particular conflict of in-
terest has not always existed, rather its origin may be traced back to 
a legislative amendment in 1941, whereby the Commission of Finance re-
placed the Industrial Commission as administrator of the State Insur-
ance Fund. Although the existing conflict between the Industrial Commission 
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and the State Insurance Fund (Department of Finance) did not 
exist then, an apparent conflict of interest was attrtbuted_to the 
Industrial Conmission for its allegedly adverse roles of adjudi-
eating claims under the Workmen's Compensation Act and administer-
ing the State Insurance Fund. This was the precise issue in the 
case of Woldberg v. ·Industrial ·corilmission, 74 Utah 309, 27~ P.609 (1929), to 
whi~h the Court responded: 
"The Industrial Commission is no less an adminis-
trative body when making awards binding upon the State 
Insurance Fund than it is when making awards binding 
upon other insurance carriers. Nor is the commission 
disqualified because of interest from making awards 
against or in favor of the State Insurance Fund. The 
Commission is an arm of the State Government charged 
with the duty of administering the Workmen's eompen-
sation Act. Its members have no financial interest in 
the fund. Their salaries are not paid out of it, and 
their compensation is neither increased nor diminished 
because of anything they may do or not do with respect 
to it. The authorities cited by app 1 i cant ( 33 C .J. 
991, note 54, 1023; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S. 
Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed 749, 50 A.L.R. 1243) have no application 
to the situation here." ·woldberg, at page 611. 
The alleged conflict of interest in Woldberg was with the Industrial 
Commission, whereas the conflict shifted to the Attorney General's Office 
in 1941 when the words "of Finance" were added to the word "Commission" 
(which previously referred to the Industrial Commission). The conflict 
arises because the Attorney General's office is statutorily required to 
defend both the Industrial Commission and the Commission of Finance. 
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(See Section 35-3-20, Utah Code Ann. (1953).) 
It is respectfully submitted that this potential con-
flict of interest was not foreseen by the Legislature in 1941 when 
it amended Chapter 3 of Title 35. 
Therefore, until the Legislature clears up this potential 
for conflict in the existing statutes, the Attorney General must, 
within the responsibility and bounds of his constitutional authority, 
act to appoint, as in the past, fair legal representation of conflic= 
ting interests or agencies with State governmento The fact alone 
of potential for conflict of interest must not here control a decision 
which should be made on constitutional grounds and should be consistent 
with court determinations as to those powers of the Attorney General of 
the State of Utah, as is well expressed in the HansS'l case, supra. 
E. THE MANDATORY REPRESENTATION OF THE STATE 
INSURANCE FUND.'S ADMINISTRATOR BY THE AT= 
TORNEY GENERAL OR ONE OF HIS DESIGNEES 
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION PRO-
VISIONS OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
In State Tax Commission v. Department of Finance, 576 P.2d 1297 
(.1978}, the State Tax Commission brought suit against the State Depart-
ment of Finance as administrator of the State Insurance Fund, for its 
refusal to pay an additional percent tax on the total premiums received 
into the Fund, above and beyond the uncontested three- and one-fourth 
percent tax on premiums required of all companies providing Workmen's 
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Compensation Insurance in Utah. The Utah Supreme Court held in favor 
of the Department of Finance, ruling that no rational basis could 
be cited to distinguish between the State Insurance Fund and 
private insurers for the purpose of extracting an unequal or higher 
tax from the State Insurnace Fund. The Court's decision appears to 
be sound and well founded. Indeed, the private monies which are paid 
into the State Insurance Fund are no different than the private monies 
paid to private insurers. Hence, no discernible basis exists to impose 
a higher tax on the publicly administered fund. 
It is one thing, however, to say that no rational basis exists 
.to di sti ngui sh between the State· Insurance Fund and private insurers 
for tax purposes, and it is quite another thing to say that no rational 
basis exists to distinguish between the two for purposes of legal repre-
sentation. Whereas, the fact that a fund of private monies is administered 
by a State officer or department may have little bearing on the validity 
of a tax levied against that private money, the fact of public administra-
tion may be decisive in determining the question of who shall appoint 
legal counsel for the administrator of the fund. The Court acknowledged 
in State Tax Commission that the State Insurance Fund is publicly admin-
istered. The Court stated: 
"The only distinguishable feature is that the Fund 
is administered by a State agency, the cost therefor being 
paid from the premiums. This feature is not a rational 
basis to treat th.e Fund as a distinct classification." 
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We respectfully submit that the proper interpretation of the Court's 
language is circumscribed by the factual setting of that particular 
case. While the administration of the State Insurance Fund by the 
Department of Finance may serve as no basis for unequal tax classi-
fications, it arguably serves as a very rational basis for compelling 
a State officer to be represented by the Attorney General in actions 
concerning his conduct while acting in his official capacity as admin-
istrator of the State Insurance Fund. Thus9 the important factual 
differences between State Tax Commission and the instant case prevent 
the rules of law pronounced in State Tax Commission from being mechan-
ically applied here. 
If the Court elects to apply the holding of State Tax Commis-
sion in the instant case, and in effect states that no substantive dif-
ference exists between the State Insurance Fund and private insurers 
for any matter, the Court may later oe haunted by the constitutional 
repercussions of such a decree. The basis for this bold prediction is 
as follows: It is inconsistent to say that the fact the State Insurance 
Fund is "publicly administered"is an insufficient basis for a reasonable 
classification between the Fund and private insurers, and then on the 
other hand, use the "publicly administered" argument to justify Section 
35-3-20, Utah Code Ann. (1953), which allows the Director of Finance to 
have the Attorney General represent him in suits concerning his actions 
as administrator of the fund. If the State Insurance Fund, along with the 
actions of the State officer who administers the fund are to be considered 
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the same as private insurers, then the Fund should not be able to 
procure the services of the Attorney General--even if such services 
are paid for exclusively by the Fund--since private insurers may not 
hire or use the Attorney General's services for private matters un-
related to the public interest. The same reasoning extends to serv-
ices rendered by the State Auditor, State Treasurer, or other State 
officials and employees who presently assist in the administration of 
the State Insurance Fund. To hold otherwise would be to sustain a 
11 reverse 11 or 11 counter 11 unequal operation of the laws. The "publicly 
administered" argument cannot be a valid underpinning in one situa-
tion and then be unconstitutional in the other. Therefore, we sub-
mit that the rule of State Tax Commission is not controlling in the 
instant case, and further submit that the mandatory representation 
of the Director of Finance by the Attorney General in matters con-
cerning his administration of the State Insurance Fund is both 
proper and constitutional, and, therefore, the ruling of the lower 
court, Judge Durham, should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT III 
LEGISLATURES HAVE ENACTED LAWS WHICH MAY BE CONTRARY 
TO CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS DELEGATED THE ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL OR COMMON-LAW POWERS. 
The power of the Legislature to enact statutes affecting the 
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functions of the office of the Attorney General do not extend to 
stripping him of all powers and leaving his office an empty shell. 
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 829 165 S.W. 2d 820. Neither the 
Legislature nor the courts can deprive the.Attorney General of the 
authority which the State Constitution has granted him. 
rel. Castle v. Daniels, 8 Ill. 2d 43, 132 N.E. 2d 507. 
People ex 
The Legis= 
lature can abridge only such powers of the Attorney General as it 
may have added to those which were inherent in the office at common 
law, which powers themselves must remain inviolate as long as the con-
stitutional grant continues. Fergus v. Russell, 270 Ill. 304, 110 
N.E. 130. 
A common provision in State Constitutions and statutes makes 
the Attorney General the legal adviser of various departments, officers, 
agencies, and specifies those which he serves as said legal adviser. 
Watson v. Caldwell, 158 Fla. 19 27 S. 2d 524. Further, a statutory 
grant of power possessed by an Attorney General does not normally de-
prive him of other common-law powers. State of Florida v. Exxon Corp., 
1976 5th Circuit, 526 F.2d 266. The question here was whether the 
Florida Attorney General had power to institute suit under Federal law 
without specific authorization of individual government entities which 
allegedly had sustained legal injuries. The Fifth Circuit Court held 
that, under Florida law, the Attorney General may institute all legal 
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proceedings necessary to protect the interests of the State. 
Even in the absence of specific provisos, it has been 
held that the Attorney General may be tacitly recognized as the 
legal adviser or representative of State agencies. Darling Apart-
ment Co. v. Springer, 25 Del. Ch. 420, 22 A.2d 397. 
Other court rulings have held that a specific provision 
requiring the Attorney General to be the adviser or representative 
for State agencies and officers does not impose on him a duty to 
so serve if the agency is acting in a proprietary rather than a 
governmental capacity. Watson v. Caldwell, 158 Fla. 1, 27 So. 2d 
524. 
There is authority for the proposition that if a statute 
creating a State office or department and setting forth its powers 
and functions, expressly authorizes the hiring of an attorney, that 
in making that appointment, the department or State office acts validly 
unless it violates a prohibition of the State Constitution. Evans v. 
Superior Court of San Francisco, 14 Cal. 2d 563, 96 P.2d 107, !Q.P_. 
dis., 309 U.S. 640, 84 L.Ed. 995, 60 S.Ct. 893, where a statute, author-
izing a building and loan commissioner to employ special counsel to 
assist him in liquidating a building and loan association, was sus-
tained. 
There is also authority as previously cited in Watson v. 
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Caldwell, supra, that a specific grant of authority to a State 
commission or agency to sue or be sued~ or to engage in litiga-
tion, has within it an implied authority for a said agency or 
commission to appoint and procure its own counselo See also 
State v. Allen, 172 La. 350, 134 S. 246. 
Contra to this position, it has been held that a Legis-
lature has no power to give the State Insurance Department or the 
Superintendent of said Department power to conduct the liquidation 
in reference to insurance companies, which has been before that 
time a duty of the Attorney General under a Constitution providing 
that the executive department should consist of certain officers, 
including the Attorney General, and that they shall "perform such 
du ti es as may be prescribed by 1aw. 11 Fergus v. Russe 11 , 270 I 11. 
304, 110 N.E. 130. 
In deciding the question of legislative authority to 
encroach on the powers and duties of the Attorney General, the lan-
guage of the statute must be considered in the light of the office 
of the Attorney General at common law and the general understanding 
of the nature of this office in its role, including public policy that 
has occurred over a period of years. Darling Apartment Co. v. Springer, 
supra. 
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A. SPECIFIC STATUTES - THE UTAH RETIREMENT BOARD 
AND UTAH RETIREMENT FUND 
The Utah State Retirement Board was established by 
authority of Senate Bill 94 passed March 14, 1963, effective 
July l, 1963, Ch. 74, Laws of Utah 1963, and Ch. 49-9-1, U.C.A. 
(1953), as amended, providing: 
"The retirement office shall be an independent 
state agency and not a division within any other 
department. It shall be subject to the usual legis-
lative and executive department controls. The re-
tirement office shall be housed at the seat of the 
Utah State government." 
The designation that the Retirement Board be at the seat 
of State government rather than the State Capitol was the effect of 
the 1973 amendment. Section 49-9-4 (9) of this authorization reads: 
"(9) To employ within the limitations of said 
budget such staff personnel and consultants as is deemed 
necessary to administer the retirement systems and 
funds assigned to the retirement office for administra-
tion. Such personnel may include actuaries, attorneys, 
medical examiners, investment counselors, accountants, 
and such clerical and other assistants as may be neces-
sary to accomplish the purpose of the retirement office. 
Compensation of the director shall be established by the 
board. 11 
The Retirement Board and the Retirement Fund that the Board 
administers are, by the words set forth in the authorization, State 
agencies or perhaps in contrast to constitutionally established rather 
than legislative established agencies, a quasi-State agency or fund. 
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The Retirement Board, respondent, denies the authority of the 
Attorney General to appoint or hire legal counsel for the Board 
or Fund and cites the statutory authority herein set forth as 
their authority to appoint their own attorneys and pay for them 
from the proceeds of the Fund. 
The Board further maintains that the Fund is a "common 
trust fund" created by the Legislature, and that the Board exists 
as a "trustee of said fund." Many cases on this subject matter 
throughout the country draw a line between the legal work done and 
the proprietary or administrative work done. It is the assertion 
of the appellant that Section 49-9-5, U.CoA. (1953), as amended, is 
speaking about .. ministerial duties" of accountants and attorneys, 
actuaries, medical examiners, investment counselors and clerks and 
assistants. 
Texas Liquor Control Board v. Continental Distilling Co., 
199 S.W. 2d 109 (Texas Civil App.), states: 
"In a sense, a state officer is one whose jurisdiction, duties, and functions are co-
extensive with the state and receives his author-
ity under state laws and performs some of the 
governmental functions of the state." 
Appellant urges upon the Court that it be interpreted neces-
sarily ~he respondents, Retirement Board and Retirement Fund, may, ac-
cording to their authorization, appoint such personnel as is required 
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for the in-house administrative or proprietary actions that 
are required. Appellant maintains that to the extent the Re-
tirement Board and Retirement Fund purport to authorize said 
in-house attorneys to represent them legally and fulfill the 
actions that are the province of the Attorney General as established 
by Section 67-5-5, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, that said author-
ization is invalid and unconstitutional. We urge upon the Court 
that the Retirement Board and Retirement Fund, and the Director 
thereof, are part of State government, and that the Director is 
a State officer and an agent of the Executive Branch of the State 
government. As such, he may have for staff purposes such aides 
as he needs for the regular business of the agencies, but he may 
not appoint his own legal counsel to conduct the ~business 
of the State for the Board or the Fund in· derogation of the consti-
tutional and common-law power of the Attorney General. 
The two considerations as to the source of funds: 
(a) source of funds for payment of legal services; and 
(b) the potential for conflict in the Attorney General's 
office in his being on two sides of an issue 
between the Retirement Fund and other State 
interests, 
should not be determinative on the question of who appoints legal 
counsel. Any authority of the Retirement Board or Retirement Fund 
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to obtain the meaning thereof. Within the confines of Section 
35=1-32, U.CoA. (1953)~ as amended, it should be clear that 
whatever the function of the "representative" who acts as a 
special prosecutor, it should be in addition to and not instead 
of the power and authority of the Attorney General by Constitu-
tion and statute. 
Section 67-5-1, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, provides: 
"j •• and prosecute or defend all causes to 
which the state or any officer, board or commission 
thereof in an official capacity as a party; 
and he shall have charge as attorney of all civil 
legal matters in which the state is in anywise in-
terested. 11 
To harmonize this provision setting forth the general duties 
of the Attorney General with the previously quoted Industrial Commis~ 
sion's authorization to appoint a special representative, the appel-
lant urges that the only reasonable conclusion one may draw is, though 
the Commission may make a designation of a representative to act as a 
special prosecutor, that party must come from within the ranks of the 
Attorney General's office or the County Attorney's office in which the 
matter lies, and that in any event any legal matters of a civil nature 
to be handled through or on behalf of the Commission, must be done under 
the authority of the Attorney General's office as an overriding authority 
vested in the Attorney General as the State's legal officer. 
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At the present time, many of the attorneys working for 
the Utah Industrial Commission are denoted as "Special Assistant 
Attorneys General. 11 These attorneys perform their functions on a 
state-wide basis. It is not disputed as a fact that the Industrial 
Commission pays its legal counsel, these "Special Assistant Attorneys 
General," further raising a question as to whether they should be 
paid directly by the Commission or through the Attorney General's 
office, and that the failure to so pay may be a violation of Section 
67-5-3, U.C.A. {1953), as amended, which provides: 
"The attorney general may assign his legal 
assistants to perform legal services for any 
agency of state government. He shall bill that 
agency for the legal services performed, if the 
agency so billed received federal matching funds 
to pay for the legal services rendered. No such inter-
account billings are to be made by the attorney gen-
eral if no federal matching funds are provided. As 
used in this act 'agency' means any department, divi-
sion, agency, commission, board, council, committee, 
authority, institution, or other entity within the 
state government of Utah. 11 
Section 35-1-32, U.C.A. {1953), as amended, deals with the 
Commission as it acts in its responsibility under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. The appellant takes the position that to make meaningful 
the statutes that have been enacted in that regard, this Court would have 
to hold that Commission has the discretion to appoint but that appoint-
ment must be made with the concurrence and under the direct supervision 
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of the Attorney General of the State. 
The Industrial Commission is an administrative bodyo 
Its duty is to administer the Workmen's Compensation law accord-
ing to the case before it and award compensation as the law 
authorizes. Aetna Life Insurance Company Vo Industrial Commis-
sion, 73 U. 366, 274 P. 139. 
Another section of the statutes relating to the Industrial 
Commission deals with the unemployment compensation provisions cov-
ered in Sections 35-4-1 through 35-4-26, UoC.A. (1953), as amended. 
Section 35-4-ll (d), U.C.A. (1953), as amended, provides: 
"The commission sha 11 appoint on a nonpartisan 
merit basis, fix the compensation, and prescribe the 
duties and powers of such officers; accountants, at-
torneys, experts, and other personnel as may be neces-
sary in the performance of its duties. The commission 
shall provide for a merit system covering all such per-
sons, classify and fix the minimum· standards for the 
personnel and formulate salary schedules for the service 
so classified, and the commission shall hold or provide 
for holding examinations to determine the technical and 
professional qualifications of applicants for positions 
in the commission, and provide for annual merit ratings 
of employees in the commission to ascertain whether such 
employees, or any of them, are maintaining the eligibility 
standards prescribed by the commission and those promulgated 
by the social security board ...• 11 
The Commission, under an informal designation of "personnel 
merit system, 11 is authorized by the Legislature in this provision as 
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it administers the Employment Security Act, to appoint and fix 
the compensation and delineate the powers and duties of its 
personnel. "Personnel" includes those "as may be necessary to 
the performance of its duties." Listed among those are accoun-
tants, attorneys and experts. 
It is again urged by appellant that, as one reads the 
full paragraph of (d) and correlates it with the general delega-
tion of power (Section 35-4-1, U.C.A. (1953), as amended), the 
only fair reading would be that the Commission, in fulfilling its 
responsibility to administer the Unemployment Compensation Act, 
would appoint such attorneys as may be necessary for the in-house 
work which may be required in claims, informal hearings, and 
formal hearings; but that any attorneys who were so appointed or 
involved in any "civil legal matters in which the State is in any-
wise interested," would of necessity have to be appointed by the 
Attorney General, and the same would be directed by the Attorney 
General and compensated through the Attorney General's office unless 
the Commission.were reimbursed by Federal funds. 
The Industrial Commission acts in an administrative role 
under administrative law as part of State government. Aetna Life 
Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission, 73 U. 366, 274 P. 139. The 
Industrial Commission has no power to exercise judicial acts or 
functions. 
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Logan City v. Industrial Commission, 85 U. 131, 38 P.2d 769. 
The director of the Utah Industrial Commission is 
a State officer, functioning to administer the Workmen's Com-
pensation law, the State Insurance Fund, Unemployment Compen-
sation; immigration, labor, and statistics; hospital and med-
ical service for disabled minors, and the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act. 
Art. VII, Section 18 of the Utah Constitution, does not 
state that the Attorney General may be the legal adviser for 
State officers--rather it specifically states that he shall be 
the "legal adviser" of the State officers. Therefore, in the 
face of this mandatory provision, appe 11 ant urges the Court to 
hold Section 35-1-32 and Section 35-4-11 (d), U.C.A. (1953), as 
amended, unconstitutional to the extent that they purport to be 
a discretionary authorization for the Industrial Commission to 
appoint its own attorneys to conduct all State legal business on 
behalf of the Commission, in opposition to the grant of authority, 
by Constitution and common law, of the Attorney General to so ap-
point. 
C. STATE INSURANCE FUND 
The Legislature, in the grant of authority to the Fund 
in Section 35-3-1, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, states: 
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11 In the conduct and administration of the 
business of said fund the commission of finance 
may appoint with the approval of the governor, a 
manager, and may employ accountants, inspectors, 
attorneys, physicians, investigators, clerks, sten-
ographers, and such other experts and assistants 
as it deems advisable." 
Respondent, the State Insurance Fund, is an entity that 
is equated to an insurance company, authorized by the Utah State 
Legislature to collect premiums from employers to provide insur-
ance coverage for injuries and diseases of employees who are work-
related and are covered by the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act, 
Sections 35-1-1, et seg., U.C.A. (1953), as amended. The Fund is 
administered by the Commissioner of Finance. Appellant, on this 
point, has set forth his position extensively in Argument II .. The 
Commissioner of Finance is a State officer. The Director of the 
Insurance Fund is a State officer and his agent. Premiums paid by 
employers to the Fund constitute the source for payment of adminis-
tration and benefits under the Fund. Employers voluntarily contri-
bute their premiums in selecting the Fund as their insurance carrier. 
The Fund is only one in a competitive market of insurance funds. 
The authority to employ attorneys is one of many of the 
staff positions for the Commission. 
In the course of the business of administering the Fund, 
the Director of Finance has hired private counsel to represent the 
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Fund in hearings, administrative review procedures, in matters 
before the Supreme Court, and in disputed claims before the 
Industrial Commission involving defen~es of the Fund that relate 
to the Commission's administration of what is called the "second 
injury fund." Sections 35-1-68 and 35-1-69, U.C.A. (1953), as 
amended. 
In this Brief, as set forth in Argument II, we specif-
ically use the State Insurance Fund as the illustration of the im-
proper inroad by all respondents, through the Legislature, to limit 
the Attorney General's constitutional powers. Appellant incorporates 
Argument II herein as standing for the proposition that Section 
35-3-1, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, is an improper legislative encroach-
ment on the powers and duties of the Attorney General by this provi-
sion of the statute concerning the appointive power of the State In-
surance Fund, unless the Court holds that said "appointive" power of 
the Commissioner of Finance is under the power of the Attorney General. 
In Hansen v. Legal Services Committee of the Utah State Leg-
islature, supra, this Court pointed out that there was a danger in al-
lowing the Legislature to create its own legal adviser and that may 
well lead to an attempt by other State officers to appoint their own 
legal counsel, which could be in contravention of the c~nstitutional 
grant of power to the Attorney General. This Court's deliberate use in 
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the Hansen case, 19 U.2d at page 233, of the open-ended phrase 
"and everyone else," refers to those other than the elected 
State officers and is sufficiently broad to encompass the ap-
pointed lesser officers acting for the State, including the Di-
rector of the Industrial Commission and the State Insurance Fund. 
· D. UNIVERSITY OF UTAH" FOR UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER 
In respondent's, University of Utah, Memorandum in Sup-
port of the Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 43), it admits the 
University of Utah and the University of Utah Medical Center are 
State agencies. Therefore, paragraph two of Judge Durham 1 s Order 
of"June 5, 19759 (R. 70), is in error, as it grants no cause of ac-
tion against appellant and in favor of the respondents. That Order 
should be reversed, in part, to conform to the evidence before the 
Court. 
E. UNIVERSITY OF UTAH FOR THE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL 
CENTER; UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER TRUST FUND; 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, TRUSTEE 
The University of Utah, on behalf of the Medical Center, made 
an agreement with First Security Bank of Utah, Trustee, to have the 
Trustee administer a trust for the purpose of allowing the Medical Cen-
ter to self-insure against malpractice and other casualty claims. To 
the extent that the Medical Center provides educational services to the 
. 
University of Utah, it is funded by the State of Utah. The Medical Cen-
ter is also funded from receipts received for patient care, including 
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Federal funds (Medicaid). (R. 43) Other than as the Trust re-
lates to the Medical Center, as its self-insuring vehicle, and as 
the Medical Center relates to the University of Utah, and the Uni-
versity of Utah receives benefit from the Medical Center as a teach-
ing entity of this State educational institution, there are no State 
funds place in the Trust. The Trust document (R. 60) authorizes 
the bank, as Trustee (with the approval of Hospital), to employ and 
pay for, from the Trust Fund, attorneys and others as "may be neces-
sary and proper to the effective administration of the self-insur-
ance program, consistent with applicable regulations, guidelines and 
directives of cognizant Federal agencies and pay from the Trust Fund 
all costs, expenses or other liabilities that may be incurred by the 
Trustee in connection therewith, except for liabilities proven to have 
been caused by any wilful misconduct of the Trusteeo 11 (R. 60) 
Respondent alleges that when the lawsuit was filed, there 
may have been aquestion as to whether the trustee of a fund, designed 
to protect the University Hospital, could retain outside counsel, separ-
ate and apart from the Attorney General •s office, but that any such ques-
tion was resolved with the passage of Senate Bill 172 in the 1979 Legis-
lative Session. (Section 63-30-28, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, effective 
May 8, 1979, is a portion of the Governmental Immunity Act, which portion 
authorized the purchase of self-insurnace by governmental entities and 
established trust accounts for self-insurance.) Section 63-30-28) 
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(1953), as amended, reads, in part: 
11 
••• Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the 
trust agreement between the governmental entity and the 
trustee may authorize the trustee to employ counsel 
to defend actions against the entity and its employees 
and to protect and safeguard the assets of the trust, 
to provide for claims investigation and adjustment 
services, to employ expert witnesses and consultants, and 
to provide such other services and functions necessary and 
proper to carry out the purposes of the trust. 11 
Respondent alleges that the amendment authorizes the Trustee 
to retain counsel in its sole discretion, and that this authorization 
supercedes Section 67-5-5, U.C.A. (1953), as amended. 
Appellant urges that Section 63-30-28, U.C.A. (1953), as 
amended, insofar as it is in opposition to Art. VII, Section 18 of the 
Utah Constitution, and Section 67-5-5, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, are 
unconstitutional. Appellant differs with respondent as to the legal in-
terpretation and conclusions reached in Hansen v. Legal Services Com-
mittee, supra. Based on the lengthy argument in Argument II relative 
to the State Insurance Fund, and Argument III, subparagraph (D) herein, 
appellant maintains that, but for the contractual relationship between 
the Trust and the University of Utah and University of Utah Medical Cen-
ter, which are clearly State agencies or entities, the Trust would not 
exist. Further, it is not the source of funds of the Trust that should 
determine the authority to appoint legal counse. As stated in Argument II, 
it is the nature of the business to be done. In interpreting this recent 
amendment and giving meaning thereto, we must either resolve the conflict 
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between the Trust authority to appoint and the constitutional 
and common-law authority of the Attorney General to appoint legal 
counsel, or we must reject Senate Bill 172 as an unconstitutional 
inroad on the power of the Attorney General. 
F. THE COURT SHOULD NARROWLY CONSTRUE THE ABOVE 
STATUTES SO AS TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL AND STATUTORY MANDATES TO THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL DISCUSSED UNDER ARGUMENTS I AND II. 
G. THE COURT SHOULD HOLD THE STATUTES EMPO~JERING THE 
RESPONDENTS TO APPOINT LEGAL COUNSEL UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL IF THEY CANNOT BE SO CONSTRUED. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should reverse, in part, the Order of Judge Durham, 
June 5, 1979, as the University of Utah and the University Medical Cen-
ter are admittedly State agencies and are represented by the Attorney 
General. 
The heart of the matter in the instant case is whether the At-
torney General possesses the right to appoint independent legal counsel 
for all State officers with the exception of State legislators. The Utah 
Supreme Court in Hansen v. Legal Services Committee of Utah State Legisla-
ture, supra, firmly renounced the Legislature 1s attempt to diminish the 
duties or emasculate the powers conferred upon the Attorney General by the 
Utah Constitution. In light of the precedent established in Hansen, any 
State officer who desires to obtain power to appoint his own independent 
legal counsel, regardless of the sources or nature of funds used for 
compensation, must follow the same procedure later pursued by the Utah 
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State Legislature: constitutional amendment. 
As was argued by the Attorney General before the Utah 
Supreme Court in Hansen, supra, Art. VII, Section 18 of the Utah 
Constitution, contains two parts: The first makes the Attorney 
General "the legal adviser for 'State Officers. 111 The second empowers 
the Legislature to legislate on matters concerning the duties of the 
Attorney General other than as legal adviser for "State Officers." 
The Legislature may impose what authorized obligations it will on the 
Attorney General, but it may not replace him with someone else to per-
form his constitutional obligation to act as legal adviser to State of-
ficers. 
Illustrative of the claims of respondents who are quasi-State 
agencies and State funds, see Argument II. 
The Attorney General also has common-law powers that define 
his responsibilities to "perform such other duties as may be provided by 
law. 11 (Art. VII, Section 18 of the Utah Constitution.) 
The scope and nature of the state-wide governmental powers ex-
ercised by the Directors of these agencies and quasi-agency funds.qualify 
them in their own right to be considered as "State Officers," but they 
are also agents of the Governor (the Director of Finance being a primary 
agent) for whom the Attorney General serves as the uncontested legal ad-
viser. It is urged that the Director of Finance and other respondents, 
as agents of the Governor, should not be able to hire independent legal 
counsel--even though authorized to do so pursuant to statute, since the 
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Governor as principal could not do the same. Thus, we submit that the 
listed statutes of Argument II are an improper legislative authori-
zation in contravention of the constitutional mandate of the Attorney 
General. 
Appellant respectfully requests this Court to reverse the 
lower court in all judgments finding for appellant against all re-
spondents as follows: 
1. That appellant is the sole legal counsel for said re-
spondents and all State agencies~to the exclusion of any independent 
counsel, and that statutes which conflict with Art. VII, Section 18 
of the Utah Constitution, and Section 67-5-3, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, 
and Section 67-5-5, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, are declared invalid 
and unconstitutional insofar as they grant authority to any State agency,, 
political subdivision, or State Fund to hire its own independent legal counsel. 
2. That all respondents may not pay independent legal counsel 
out of its funds for legal services performed; and granting appellant 
permanent injunction against said respondents from paying for legal services 
and hiring independent legal co~u~s~~.~7;J .u .. 11(/,f··.u).~fi~·i ed!}Jl///4W;; . !/). 
RNARD M. TANNER 
Assistant Attorney General 
WILLIAM G. GIBBS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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